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Abstract
Proponents of the Everett interpretation of Quantum Theory have
made efforts to show that to an observer in a branch, everything happens
as if the projection postulate were true without postulating it. In this
paper, we will indicate that it is only possible to deduce this rule if one
introduces another postulate that is logically equivalent to introducing the
projection postulate as an extra assumption. We do this by examining
the consequences of changing the projection postulate into an alternative
one, while keeping the unitary part of quantum theory, and indicate that
this is a consistent (although strange) physical theory.
1 Introduction
An important part in the programme of ’the Everett interpretation’ (first pro-
posed in Everett 1957) or the relative state interpretation of quantum theory is
to avoid postulating the Projection Postulate (PP) which von Neuman (1955)
entitled ’process (1)’, so that we can assume that only unitary evolution is nec-
essary, and that this induces, for an observer, a measurement history as if the
Projection Postulate were true (Dewitt & Graham, 1973). The relative state
view on quantum theory needs to address two issues in order to produce the
effects of the Born rule: (i) it needs to show in what basis an effective Born rule
will emerge and (ii) it needs to show that the correct probabilities will emerge
for an observer. A good recent overview of the history of the subject can for
example be found in the work of Rubin (2003).
Much progress has been made on (i), mainly through the decoherence pro-
gramme, thoroughly described in a book by Joos et al. (2005). Its relevance
for the Everett programme is for instance described in work by Zurek (1998).
However, (ii) seems to be much more problematic.
As an example of recent work on (ii), Deutsch (1999) has proven an inter-
esting theorem, which states, under additional ’reasonable’ assumptions, that
the only way a rational decider can assign probabilities to outcomes of future
quantum measurements, is through the Born rule. Several papers then argued
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on the validity of this proof (Hanson 2003 ; Wallace 2002, 2003 ; Gill 2003
; Greaves 2004). Finkelstein (2000) claims that Gleason’s theorem solves the
issue ; but this theorem also contains an additional assumption.
We will argue in this paper that the extra assumptions, in all these cases,
are logically equivalent to introducing the PP. This doesn’t affect the value
of Deutsch’s and other’s work, which allow us to reformulate the PP in other
terms, and thus to understand better what exactly are its essential ingredients.
But it means that there is no hope of deriving the PP directly from the rest
of the machinery of quantum theory, and hence puts that part of the Everett
programme to an end.
The situation is in certain ways reminiscent of attempts, during more than 2
millennia, of deducing Euclid’s Fifth Postulate (Trudeau, 1987 gives a marvelous
account on that history) from the other postulates of Euclidean geometry, until
it was resolved by Gauss and Bolyai and independently by Lobachebsky, by
showing that there was a consistent way of building Non-Euclidean geometry
by explicitly introducing an alternative Fifth Postulate. We will try to apply the
same strategy: we will postulate an Alternative Projection Postulate (APP) and
see that this gives rise to a consistent theory on the same level as the standard
theory — even if the theory is experimentally of course completely wrong. The
very logical existence of this theory then indicates the independence of the PP
from the unitary part of quantum theory.
Apart from proving the logical independence of the PP from the unitary part
of quantum theory, constructing such a logical alternative has another practical
advantage: it allows one more easily to find out where ”proofs” of the PP make
hidden (or explicit) extra assumptions. We will then examine where exactly it
is in disagreement with Deutsch’s ’reasonable assumptions’, or with Gleason’s
theorem.
2 The Alternative Projection Postulate.
Let us propose a quantum theory a` la von Neumann (1955), except for the
projection postulate (which he calls process (1)), which we replace by the Al-
ternative Projection Postulate (APP). It has to be said that the APP can seem
slightly more limited in scope than the original PP, in that only measurements
with a finite number of different outcomes are handled. However, this is not a
physical shortcoming, because any true measurement can result only in a finite
amount of information, and hence in a finite number of discrete outcomes. We
propose the APP:
Let {Xˆk} be a set
1 of commuting self-adjoint operators with a fi-
nite, common discrete spectrum (the different possible outcomes of
the measurement). This finite spectrum is given by a finite series
1We need a set, only because we want to be able to label the outcomes with several
different real numbers. As long as there are only a finite number of different outcomes, one
single operator could in principle be sufficient.
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of sets of eigenvalues {xk}i. The full set of {Xˆk} defines the mea-
surement to be performed. To each different set of eigenvalues {xk}i
of {Xˆk} corresponds a projector Pi on the space of common eigen-
vectors belonging to {xk}i. There are by hypothesis only a finite
number of such projectors, which form a complete, orthogonal set 2.
Let N be the (finite) number of projectors Pi. Let |ψ〉 be the state of
the system in Hilbert space before the measurement. Let nψ be the
number of projectors for which Pi|ψ〉 is different from 0. We obvi-
ously have: 1 ≤ nψ ≤ N . If the system is in state |ψ〉, each of the set
of values {xk}i corresponding to such a projector has a probability
1/nψ to be realized. The other sets of values have probability 0 to
be realized. If the outcome of the measurement equals {xk}u, then
the state after measurement equals Pu|ψ〉, properly normalized.
One notices the difference with the original PP as found in most standard
texts on quantum mechanics, such as Cohen-Tannoudji (1997): the probability
equals 1/nψ instead of 〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉
3.
We should point out that the APP is in fact the most natural probability rule
that goes with the Everett interpretation: on each ”branching” of an observer
due to a measurement, all of its alternative ’worlds’ receive an equal probability.
3 Consistency of Quantum Theory based upon
the APP.
The alternative quantum theory (which is normal quantum theory, with the
PP replaced by the APP, for short AQT) will turn out to be a physical theory
which is completely different from standard quantum theory (SQT) and also
experimentally totally wrong. However, we will try to show that it is a consistent
theory on the same level as SQT. It is a priori very difficult to prove that a
physical theory is consistent. However, the bulk of the mathematical machinery
of SQT and AQT is the same (the unitary evolution). The intervention of the
APP on the mathematical machinery is the same as the PP (indeed, it is a
projection of the state vector on an eigenspace, followed by a normalization of
the projection, in both cases). So on the purely mathematical side, both theories
are identical concerning the evolution of the state vector.
The subtler aspects are related the physical interpretation. Indeed, the PP
is the only link to experimental quantities, and this is replaced by the APP.
We have to ensure that through the APP, we arrive at an operational definition
of the mathematical entities which is consistent. We will show that it is in
fact exactly the same as in SQT. Furthermore, we have to prove that different
mathematical descriptions describing the same physical situation give identical
2This means that
∑
i Pi = 1 and that PiPj = 0 if i 6= j.
3We could even go further and postulate the probability to be equal to α/nψ + (1 −
α)〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉 with α a real number between 0 and 1, which defines a generalized APP for each
value of α.
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results. This means invariance under unitary transformations, and invariance
under different ways of formulating the same measurement process.
3.1 Respect of unitary transformations.
The representation of the state space, and all of the unitary evolution machinery,
can undergo a unitary transformation without changing their interpretation. We
have to ensure that our AQT gives identical results when such an isomorphism
is applied. So we need to show:
Any unitary transformation of the Hilbert space of states, such that
|ψ〉 is mapped upon U |ψ〉 and every observable O is mapped upon
UOU †, leaves the results and effects of measurements, such as they
are introduced by the APP, invariant.
The proof is straightforward. First of all, the projectors Pi are transformed
into UPiU
†, so that the projections of U |ψ〉 are transformed into UPi|ψ〉. This
projection is zero if and only if Pi|ψ〉 = 0, so the number of non-zero projections
n is conserved, as well as the eigenvalues {xk}i which belong to such projections.
The probabilities of the measurement results are hence the same before and
after the transformation. Also any further evolution, after the measurement, is
equivalent to the evolution before transformation, given that the state after the
measurement (with result {xk}u) is now UPu|ψ〉, properly normalized, which
is nothing else but the transformation, under U , of the state we would have
obtained under the same circumstances.
3.2 Measurement results predicted with certainty in AQT
and SQT are the same.
In SQT, the interpretation of the mathematical entities (state vector, observable
etc...) is completely fixed by the experimental results predicted with certainty.
We will show that this interpretation is exactly the same in AQT.
If |ψ〉 is an eigenvector of the different Xˆk with respective eigenvalues
{xk}i, then the measurement will give with certainty the result {x
k}i
for this observable, and the state after measurement will still be |ψ〉.
The proof is trivial and based upon the fact that Pi|ψ〉 = |ψ〉 and Pj |ψ〉 = 0
for i 6= j.
We also have:
If |ψ〉 doesn’t have any component with eigenvalues {xk}i, then the
measurement will give a result which is different from {xk}i, with
certainty.
This is a direct consequence of the APP.
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3.3 Equivalence of physically identical measurements.
Two measurements are physically identical if exactly the same information is ex-
tracted by either of both measurements. We will show that two mathematically
different sets of observables, {Xk} and {Yk}, which correspond to physically
identical measurements, result in operationally identical results.
If {Xk} and {Yk} extract the same information, this means that to each dis-
tinct set of eigenvalues {xk}i corresponds exactly one set of distinct eigenvalues
{yk}i and vice versa ; and that for each case where the result of measurement
of {Xk} gives with certainty {x
k}i, then the result of the measurement if we
measure {Yk} should give with certainty {y
k}i. But this means that P
X
i = P
Y
i .
As only the projectors play a role in the APP, the two measurements with
equivalent sets of observables yield exactly the same results under the APP.
4 Strange properties of AQT.
We will discuss some strange properties of AQT, which immediately disqualify
it as a possible candidate of a physical theory of our world. However, we want to
emphasize that such a world is a logical possibility including the unitary part of
quantum theory, even if it is a very strange one to our standards. By examining
some very strange and ’unreasonable’ properties, we also show how easy it is to
eliminate AQT by introducing ’reasonable assumptions’.
If we take the topology induced by the Hilbert in product, then an arbitrary
small change of |ψ〉 (by adding a small component of an eigenspace that was
orthogonal to |ψ〉) can induce a discrete change in probabilities of outcomes.
But this, as such, is not an internal contradiction of the theory. Note also that
in general, the state of a system is never strictly orthogonal to an eigenspace of
a set of observables (except immediately after measurement), so one can usually
assume that N = n, except immediately after a measurement.
This also means that if there is a small time lapse between two identical
measurements, that the two results are uncorrelated except in the case where
all the {Xk} commute with the full Hamiltonian of the system. Although this
result seems very strange indeed, it does not necessarily indicate an internal
inconsistency, but just means that measurements incompatible with the full H
are a waste of time, because the information is immediately lost. As we usually
don’t know the full H , this means that most measurements are a waste of time.
AQT describes a very random world indeed, in which, most of the time, the
outcomes of measurements are independent of the state the system is in!
Another strange property of AQT is the following. Imagine that we consider
two different, commuting observables, measuring the same quantity. We have
a course-grained one, X , and a fine-grained one, Y . Let us assume that Y has
5 distinct eigenvalues, namely 1,2,3,4, and 5. Let us assume that X has two
eigenvalues, 10 and 20, and that X takes on value 10 when Y takes on value 1,
and that X takes on the value 20 when Y takes on the values 2,3,4, and 5. For
a general state |ψ〉 which isn’t ’particular’ with respect to X or Y (meaning,
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has non-zero components for all of their eigenstates), a measurement consisting
purely of X will result in a probability 0.5 for value 10, and 0.5 for value 20.
A measurement consisting purely of Y will give a probability of 0.2 for each of
(1,2,3,4 and 5), and hence, if we calculate X from it, a probability of 0.2 for
finding 10 and a probability 0.8 for finding 20. So, depending on whether we
measure also Y or not, the result x = 10 has a probability of 0.5 or 0.2. At first
sight, this is a strange result ; however it is not an inconsistency, and just extends
the ”strangeness” already present in SQT. In SQT, incompatible measurements
influence each other’s outcome probabilities ; in AQT, even compatible, but
different, measurements influence each other’s otucome probabilities. Indeed,
the measurement consisting purely of X is not physically equivalent with the
measurement consisting of X,Y , because a different amount of information is
extracted. On the other hand, the measurement X,Y and the measurement Y
are identical, because the measurement of Y is also a measurement of X ; this
is an illustration of the equivalence of measurements. It is a property of AQT
that changing the resolution of a measurement can change the probabilities of
the outcome of the crude measurement, which is not the case under SQT. Note
that this property of SQT is the ’non-contextuality’ needed in the application of
Gleason’s theorem. Indeed, in AQT, the fact that the probability of measuring
10 forX depends on whether we have measured Y or not (and which corresponds
physically to two different measurement situations), means that AQT is not
non-contextual. So an axiom of non-contextuality can be seen as an axiom,
equivalent to the Born rule.
We now see where some of Deutsch’s ’reasonable’ assumptions (made more
explicit in Wallace (2003)) explicitly rule out AQT. One instance is requiring
identical probabilities under Payoff Equivalence, when the function f(xi) is not
invertible (meaning, for xi 6= xj we can have f(xi) = f(xj). Indeed, in AQT, the
measurement f(X) and X are not considered equivalent because f(X) extracts
less information from the system than X . Using payoff equivalence with f non-
bijective is a crucial point in the proof of Deutsch’s theorem, as made clear in
steps (35) and (36) in Wallace (2003).
We want again to emphasize that these strange results are a logical possi-
bility of a theory evolving according to ”unitary quantum theory”. They are
simply different from those given by SQT, in the same way that geometrical
results in hyperbolic geometry are different from the geometrical results by
Euclidean geometry, and are ”strange” as compared to everyday ”geometrical
measurements”.
5 Discussion
In this paper we tried to show that quantum theory, with the projection pos-
tulate replaced by an alternative one, gives rise to a consistent physical theory,
at least at the same level as standard quantum theory. This theory has very
strange consequences and can certainly not describe our world, but its consis-
tency (in relation to standard theory) proves that it is not possible to deduce
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the projection postulate from the ’unitary’ part of quantum theory, in the same
way it is not possible to deduce Euclid’s Fifth Axiom from the four other ones.
All attempts to do so by introducing extra assumptions just indicate that those
extra assumptions are logically equivalent to the projection postulate. This, by
itself, is not necessarily a meaningless exercise.
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